Institutions in the economic fitness landscape: what impact do welfare state institutions have on economic performance? by Schettkat, Ronald
www.ssoar.info
Institutions in the economic fitness landscape:
what impact do welfare state institutions have on
economic performance?
Schettkat, Ronald
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Schettkat, R. (2002). Institutions in the economic fitness landscape: what impact do welfare state institutions
have on economic performance? (Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung,
Forschungsschwerpunkt Arbeitsmarkt und Beschäftigung, Abteilung Arbeitsmarktpolitik und Beschäftigung, 02-210).
Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-113242
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  discussion paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FS I 02 - 210 
 
 
Institutions in the Economic Fitness Landscape  
What Impact do Welfare State Institutions have 
on Economic Performance? 
 
Ronald Schettkat* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 2002 
ISSN Nr. 1011-9523 
 
 
______________________ 
 
*) Department of Economics 
Faculty  of Social Sciences 
Utrecht University 
Heidelberglaan 2 
NL-3584 CS Utrecht 
The Netherlands 
email: R.Schettkat@fss.uu.nl 
 
 
ZITIERWEISE / CITATION 
 
 
 
Ronald Schettkat 
 
Institutions in the Economic Fitness Landscape 
What Impact do Welfare State Institutions have on Economic 
Performance? 
 
Discussion Paper FS I 02 -210 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 2002 
 
 
Forschungsschwerpunkt: Research Area: 
Arbeitsmarkt und Labour Market and 
Beschäftigung Employment 
 
 
Abteilung: Research Unit: 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik und Labour Market Policy 
Beschäftigung and Employment 
 
 
 Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 
 Reichpietschufer 50 
 D-10785 Berlin 
e-mail: wzb@wz-berlin.de 
Internet: http://www.wz-berlin.de 
 
 Abstract 
This paper uses data from 20 OECD countries to investigate the impact of welfare state 
institutions (especially employment protection, wage bargaining and work incentives) on the 
functioning of the labour market both theoretically and empirically. It shows that the impact 
of welfare state institutions is not as clear-cut as the deregulationists' view suggests. This 
result may be surprising against the background of the common view that welfare state 
measures cause European employment problems but it is in line with the outcomes of many 
other economic studies. The reasons for the ambiguous effects of welfare state institutions are 
manifold but the most important reason is the complexity of the impacts. There are many 
side-effects or second-round effects of welfare state institutions which, although often 
neglected, prove to be very important in the real ‘imperfect market’ world. Many welfare state 
institutions only have a clear-cut negative effect against the background of the theoretical 
perfect market model. 
 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Das Papier untersucht anhand von Daten aus 20 OECD Ländern den Einfluss von wohlfahrts-
staatlichen Einrichtungen (insbesondere Arbeitsschutz, Tarifverhandlungen und Arbeits-
anreize) auf die Funktion von Arbeitsmärkten sowohl theoretisch als auch empirisch. Es zeigt 
auf, dass der Einfluss der wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Einrichtungen nicht so eindeutig ist, wie es 
die Sichtweise der Deregulierer nahe legt.  Dieses Ergebnis mag überraschend sein vor dem 
Hintergrund der allgemein vertretenen Ansicht, dass wohlfahrtsstaatliche Maßnahmen die 
Ursache der europäischen Beschäftigungsprobleme sind; es stimmt aber mit den Ergebnissen 
anderer wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Studien überein. Die Gründe für die mehrdeutigen 
Auswirkungen von wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Einrichtungen sind vielfältig, aber der wichtigste 
Grund ist die Komplexität der Einflüsse. Es gibt viele Nebeneffekte oder nachgelagerte 
Effekte von wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Einrichtungen, die – obwohl oft vernachlässigt – sich als 
sehr wichtig in der realen "unvollkommenen Marktwelt" erweisen. Viele wohlfahrtsstaatliche 
Institutionen haben nur einen eindeutig negativen Effekt vor dem Hintergrund des theoretisch 
perfekten Marktmodells. 
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1. Introduction: Institutions and Economic Fitness 
Many European countries -usually described as developed welfare states- have suffered 
recently from persistently high unemployment, low employment-population rates and 
apparently underdeveloped service sectors. By contrast, the US achieved record low 
unemployment in the 1990s. The common notion (see e.g. the OECD’s jobs study) is that 
high European unemployment is structural in the sense that institutional arrangements create 
high equilibrium unemployment. However, some European countries have experienced strong 
employment growth and achieved high employment-population rates despite the fact that they 
are among the most generous welfare states in the world. Moreover, where countries have 
eased employment protection, reduced unemployment benefits and strengthened eligibility 
criteria (as many have), cross-national and longitudinal analyses do not suggest that this 
‘deregulation’ has had a substantial impact on employment or unemployment. 
There are many potential reasons for unemployment but the observation of 
unemployment is surely not sufficient in itself to justify the conclusion that labor markets are 
malfunctioning. Also, the share of long-term unemployment may be regarded as endogenous 
to high unemployment simply caused by a selection process and demand deficiency. 
However, the most widely accepted explanation for high European unemployment is that 
European-type welfare state institutions are an impediment to economic development because 
they create frictions leading to sclerosis. If Europe wants to maintain its position in the world 
economy, it needs to change its institutions. The typical line of argument proceeds as follows: 
Firstly, it is argued on a theoretical basis that European welfare state institutions shift the 
economy away from Pareto efficiency. 
Secondly, it is claimed that US institutions come closest to the ‘perfect market model’ or 
‘best practice’ respectively and that the economic success of the US shows the superiority 
of the Anglo-Saxon model.  
Thirdly, it is argued that strong coalitions prevent the implementation of the ‘necessary’ 
reforms. It is claimed that, although theoretical analysis shows what the necessary reforms 
are, political interests (rent-seeking coalitions) prevent societies from adopting these 
recipes. 
Fourthly, it is claimed that a delay in the ‘necessary’ reforms will reduce international 
competitiveness. Globalized capitalism forces countries to bring their institutions into line 
with ‘best practice’. Just as it used to be thought that competition between firms would 
only allow companies conforming to ‘best practice’ to survive in the market, so 
globalization will only allow the most efficient institutional arrangements to survive. 
This reasoning depends on many assumptions. Basically, it holds for a perfect market world 
but not at all necessarily for the real world, with all its deviations from the perfect model. A 
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long list of papers contrast European-type welfare state institutions with the perfect market 
model and, of course, identify these institutions as impediments. A ‘prototype’ example for 
this approach is Horst Sieberts’ (1997) contribution ‘Labour Market Rigidities: At the Root of 
Unemployment in Europe’. Siebert basically identifies welfare state measures as deviations 
from the perfect market model and concludes that 'policies against the perfect market model' 
can only distort otherwise smoothly functioning markets. Many welfare state regulations may 
indeed look unnecessary and inefficient when compared with the perfect market model. A 
different view may be taken when the presence of market imperfections is remembered (see 
e.g. Schettkat 1992, Blank/Freeman 1994, Atkinson 2000, Buttler/Franz/Soskice/Schettkat 
1996, Agell 1999, Krueger 2000, Stiglitz 2000). It has been shown that even small deviations 
from perfect market assumptions (Akerlof/Yellen 1985) can create outcomes very different 
from the perfect market equilibrium. Furthermore, market processes can create sub-optimal 
outcomes and macro results which do not fit the preferences of any (!) individual (Schelling 
1978). In this situation, institutions are necessary to achieve the social and individual 
optimum. 
Regulations clearly limit ceteris paribus the scope for discretionary decisions by 
employers, but only in the perfect market model are they simply restrictions and distortions; 
in a less perfect environment they may well create opportunities. For example, works councils 
may not only constrain managerial decisions but also give workers a ‘voice’ and thus improve 
decision-making (Hirschman 1970, Freeman/Medoff 1984, Wolf/Zwick 2002). Furthermore, 
there is usually more than one way to do things and some instruments may actually facilitate 
adjustments (for example, a reduced working hours subsidy can provide a short-term 
alternative to dismissals, see e.g. Abraham/Houseman 1993).  
Many welfare state institutions have been introduced to protect workers or to give them 
security. Unemployment insurance is, of course, intended to prevent wages falling below a 
certain level. Many unemployment insurances grew out of workers’ self-help initiatives and in 
some countries unemployment insurances are still administered by unions. However, other 
branches of social security have been introduced to protect employers. It was high claims for 
compensation following accidents in the workplace and the related high risks for employers 
that led to the introduction of the ‘work-related accident insurance’, the first social insurance 
introduced by Bismarck. Insurance, of course, creates incentives for free-rider behavior and 
moral hazard, with the consequential need to introduce, monitor and enforce standards of 
safety at work. Nevertheless, this very first social insurance was introduced to protect 
employers rather than workers and to shift compensation claims from the private-law to the 
public-law sphere.  
However, the perfect market model is still the point of reference in economic policy and 
many ‘political economy’ papers (see e.g. Saint-Paul 1996) likewise base their proposals on 
this model, albeit appending explanations of the non-implementation of the ‘perfect market 
solution’. The interest of ‘rent-seeking’ coalitions (usually employed insiders or unions) lies 
in using their power to prevent the implementation of perfect market solutions and so to 
protect their rents. Empirical support for the deregulationists’ hypothesis is claimed to come 
from the more favorable employment trends in the 'deregulated' US economy. Although the 
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US showed excellent economic performance in the late 1990s, it was not always regarded as 
the best performer and some European countries actually performed better than the US during 
that period. Not long ago, Japan was expected to be the leading economy in the 21st century 
because of the superiority of its institutions compared with those of the US: team-oriented 
management techniques vs. overly specialized individualists; flat vs. hierarchical 
organizations; long-term employment relations providing the necessary stability for 
employees and employers to invest in human capital vs. high labor turnover and poaching; 
long-run development strategies ('long-termism') of Japanese banks and management and the 
MITI vs. the 'short-termism' and short-run profit-seeking of US banks and shareholders. 
Almost the same list is used today to 'explain' the present problems of the Japanese economy 
and the current success of the US. The US was seen by American economists as an economic 
system able to prosper in terms of McJobs but unable to create 'good jobs' and certainly 
totally unable to create sophisticated new products. Yet in the late 1990s the US became the 
world-leader in the most innovative industries (Krugman 2000) and is now regarded as 
particularly well-suited to achieve radical innovations. The Netherlands is a similar case. It 
used to be claimed that the corporatist culture and consensus-seeking of the Netherlands 
enabled an even distribution of the burdens in a shrinking economy but prevented dynamic 
economic development. Yet the country's success in the 1990s was said to be due precisely to 
this corporatist culture. Many other countries could be added to this list. Success seems to 
attract attention and it is almost always possible to identify some institutional characteristic 
which can serve as an 'explanation' for it. If the 'explanation' fits our prior assumptions, we are 
apparently prepared to accept it without critical examination. 
This paper questions the conventional ‘deregulationist’ analysis on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds. It proceeds as follows: firstly, it discusses different theoretical models 
relating economic fitness to institutions (economic fitness landscapes), together with the 
consequences of the different models for economic analysis. Then, it analyzes theoretical 
arguments concerning the effects on economic performance of welfare state institutions such 
as wage bargaining, employment protection legislation, transfers (including unemployment 
benefits) and taxes. These are the institutional arrangements high on the deregulationists’ list  
(see Siebert 1997). The impact of these institutions on economic performance are analyzed 
and facts about the institutional arrangements are presented.  
• Do institutional differences cause differences in economic fitness? 
• Is there any one institutional arrangement that leads to peak performance at all times?  
• Does competitiveness require that labor institutions conform to a single ‘best practice’ in 
a globalized world? 
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2. Theoretical Considerations: Market Imperfections and Institutions 
In the perfect market model with globalized capitalism, only one ‘best practice’ can survive. 
There is such a thing as THE optimum national institutional arrangement and ultimately all 
countries must adopt it. Although there are no markets for institutions, the selection process in 
the stylized economy will only allow ‘best practice’ to survive. Just as firms with sub-optimal 
organizational structures will not survive in conditions of market competition, so international 
competition in conditions of globalized capitalism will require countries with sub-optimal 
national institutional arrangements to conform to ‘best practice’. International competition in 
a globalized capitalist economy is thought to impose the optimum national institutional 
arrangement on countries, just as competition within markets imposes the optimum 
organizational structure on firms. In a diagram showing institutional arrangements on the 
horizontal and economic fitness on the vertical axis, there would be only one peak 
representing the ‘best practice’ institutional arrangement (left-hand diagram in Figure 2.1).1  
Figure 2.1: Economic fitness landscapes 
 
  Single peak    multiple peak 
 
 
Source: inspired by Freeman 2000 
The single-peak world is intellectually attractive and deeply ingrained in economics, perhaps 
because it allows for clear and precise policy prescriptions. Changing institutions in the 
direction of the ‘best practice’ institutional arrangement will always improve economic 
fitness. All that is necessary is to identify the leader in terms of economic fitness, investigate 
the institutional differences and eliminate them. Policy advice is a risk-free business in the 
                                                 
1  The metaphor of a ‘fitness landscape’ was first developed in biology to describe the ability to survive as a 
function of genetic code (Bak 1997: 118/119) and was to my knowledge first introduced into economics by 
Richard Freeman (2000). 
econom ic fitness econom ic fitness
institutions institutions
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single-peak world. This vision underlies (usually implicitly) many cross-country studies, 
which take the inter-country difference in economic performance and assume this to be 
caused by the inter-country difference in institutional arrangements, as illustrated in the left-
hand panel of Figure 2.1. Once the institutional differences are identified, the policy 
prescription is simple: ‘follow the leader and you improve economic fitness’.   
However, there may be more than one peak in the economic fitness landscape (right-hand 
panel of Figure 2.1). After all, different institutional arrangements may best serve economies 
specializing in different kinds of production. Countries may specialize according to their 
natural and historical (path-depending) advantages. For example, one country may specialize 
in medium-tech industries using a roughly homogenous labor force with medium skills, while 
another country may specialize in high-tech industries, probably in combination with a large 
part of the economy in low-tech industries. This is roughly the difference between the German 
and the US economy, with the former relying on a ‘medium-skilled’ labor force and the latter 
depending on a combination of low-skilled and high-skilled workers in almost every industry 
(Freeman/Schettkat 1999). International trade may allow the two economies to achieve a 
similar level of economic fitness, so that the fitness landscape will have two peaks coinciding 
with different institutional arrangements. In this example, the difference in the institutional 
arrangements allows the economies to achieve similar fitness. Moving one country towards 
the institutional arrangement of the other country would reduce economic fitness, since each 
country already has the institutional arrangement best fitting its structure and resources.  
Learning from other countries in a multi-peak economic fitness landscape is difficult and 
policy advice is hard to give. This world also requires a very different approach to 
international comparative research. It is no longer sufficient to identify the leader and then 
mimic the institutional arrangement of that country. Instead, the relationship between 
institutional arrangements and economic performance has to be carefully investigated to reach 
an understanding of why institutions differ and to decide whether they are ideally suited to the 
structure of the economy. To identify the impact of institutions on economic fitness, it is 
necessary at least to investigate whether changes in institutions lead to the assumed effect on 
economic fitness. Whereas it is sufficient in a single-peak world to conduct a cross-country 
study, the multi-peak world requires at least the investigation of initial differences (and 
international comparative study or a ‘difference in the difference’ analysis). The two 
approaches to international comparative studies are illustrated in Figure 2.2.  
Another difficulty is the multi-dimensionality of institutional arrangements, which make 
them difficult to identify, and the fact that indicators intended to summarize institutional 
arrangements are always debatable (see below). Furthermore, economic fitness is likewise 
multi-dimensional and to some extent debatable. Even though the consensus may be greater in 
this respect than with regard to institutions, it will still be necessary to discuss which 
economic aspects are to be included in an economic fitness measure, whether they are 
compatible or competitive (for example, unemployment and inflation), and how different 
variables should be weighted when summarized in a single indicator. The single-peak vision 
requires that a single institutional arrangement be deemed to be ‘best practice’ in relation to 
various dimensions of ‘economic fitness’ and different periods of time.  
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Many economists may agree to describe economic fitness in terms of: 
- growth of per capita income (GDP per capita) 
- productivity growth  
- unemployment  
- price stability  
- external trade balance 
and (although much more controversial) 
- inequality 
Leaving inequality aside, Figure 2.3 shows ‘radar diagrams’ for ranking six big OECD 
countries (Germany, France, Italy, UK, US and Japan) in these economic dimensions for the 
averages of the 1960s, the 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s. The single-peak vision requires that 
the ‘best practice’ country ranks number one in all dimensions and in all four periods, 
provided that there was no very great change in institutions. In other words, the country lines 
should not cross each other in the radar diagrams. However, Figure 2.3 shows that the 
country-specific lines do cross, demonstrating that no country has been the top performer in 
all dimensions and over all periods. The single-peak vision certainly does not hold when all 
four periods are included in the analysis. 
Japan came closest to being the ‘single-peak country’ in the 1980s. In that period Japan 
ranked number one in 4 of the five dimensions (ranking after Germany only in export 
surplus), whereas US performance was average or worse in 4 dimensions of economic fitness. 
This explains the popularity of the Japanese model at that time. Weighting all five dimensions 
of economic fitness equally and taking the mean, Germany ranked number one in the 1960s 
and remained well ahead of the US up to the 1980s. Only in the 1990s did the US rank 
number one on average, and then only in one dimension: growth of per capita GDP. Apart 
from this, the US ranked number one only in terms of inflation and only in the 1960s. In all 
other dimensions, the US often ranked below the average.  
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Figure 2.2: The cross-country and international comparative approach 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: Average rankings for economic fitness (average country ranking computed on the 
basis of growth of per capita income, productivity growth, unemployment rate, 
inflation rate and external trade balance) 
 
average rankings 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 
Germany 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.4 
France 3.6 3.4 3.8 3.8 
Italy 3.2 3.6 4.8 4.2 
UK 4.0 4.4 4.4 3.8 
US 4.6 4.8 4.0 2.6 
Japan 3.2 2.2 1.2 3.2 
 
Source: Computations based on OECD, Economic Outlook Database
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Figure 2.3: Radar diagrams for economic performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Computation based on OECD Economic Outlook database
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3. The Impact of Institutions in Imperfect Markets 
This section discusses likely impacts of institutions on economic fitness. It starts with wage 
bargaining systems and their impact on wage distribution and employment. The impact on wage 
distribution is discussed against the background of differences in skill levels as measured by the 
International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS, OECD 1997). Section 3.2 discusses the impact of 
employment protection on employment and section 3.3 analyzes work incentives, making use of 
detailed data provided by the Dutch Central Planning Bureau. 
3.1  Wage Bargaining Institutions, Wage Distribution, Skills and Employment 
Wage bargaining institutions can influence the aggregate wage trend, as Bruno and Sachs (1985) 
emphasize, but they can also affect wage dispersion (Freeman 1988, Rowthorn 1992, 
Appelbaum/Schettkat 1995). “Equal pay for equal work” is part of almost any union’s program 
and larger unions can be expected to enforce this more comprehensively than smaller ones. Wage 
bargaining can take place between individual firms and individual employees or company unions 
at the one extreme (decentralized bargaining), or between national unions and employers 
associations at the other (centralized bargaining, for a summary discussion see 
Appelbaum/Schettkat 1995). Traditionally, economists have favored decentralized bargaining 
because it is closest to the ‘perfect market’ model, in which neither the supply side nor the 
demand side have any market power and both are price-takers. Distortions in labor markets have 
usually been identified as the misuse of market power by unions, classified as monopolies, 
pushing up wages and compressing the wage structure (e.g., Sinn 1998, Monopolkommission 
1994). Indeed, in a cross-country comparison, wage differentials decline in direct linear relation 
to increasing union density and indicators measuring the degree of centralization of wage 
bargaining institutions. The more centralized the bargaining system, the less the wage inequality 
(Freeman 1988, Appelbaum/Schettkat 1996). It is a single-peak landscape with the peak (the 
highest inequality) occurring on the left with decentralized wage bargaining (see Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1: Bargaining indices, union density, wage differentials and incidence of low pay 
 
wage bargaining indicators inequality 
union density 
(% of  labor force) 
Coverage Rate level of wage 
bargaining 
Centralization/ 
coordination 
(OECD) 
Calmfors/ 
Driffill 
ranking1) 
wages 
(D9/D1) 
incidence 
low 
pay** 
% 
 
1975 1995 1970s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1970s/80s 1990s 1970s 1980 1990  
children 
living  in 
poverty 
residuals 
Hartog/ 
Teulings 
 1 3 4 6 7 8 14 15 13 1 2 4 5 6 
Australia 56.0 . 88 . 2 1 2 1 7 2.8 2.8 14 12 . 
Austria 56.1 41 98 97 2 2 3 3 15 3.5 3.5 13  0.26 
Belgium 55.3 54 90 82 2 2 2 2 9 2.4 2.3 7 4 . 
Canada 34.4 . 37 . 1 1 1 1 1 4.0 4.4 23 15 0.38 
Denmark . 78 . 52 . . 3 3 . . . . 5 . 
Finland 67.4 80 95 67 3 1.5 3 2 12 2.5 2.5 5.5 4 0.29 
France 22.8 10 85 75 2 2 2 2 6 3.3 3.3 13.5 8 0.35 
Germany 36.6 29 91 80 2 2 3 3 11 2.7 2.5 13 11 0.33 
Ireland . 47 . . . . 2 3 . . . . 17 . 
Italy . 39 . . . . 1 3 . . . . 20 . 
Japan 34.4 . 28 21 1 1 1 1 4 3.0 3.2 15 12 . 
Netherlands 38.4 24 76 79 2 2 2 3 10 2.5 2.6 12 8 0.22 
New Zealand 50.1 . 67  2 2 2 1 8 2.9 3.0 17  . 
Norway 52.7 55 75 62 3 3 3 3 14 2.1 2.0 n.a. 3 0.23 
Portugal 52.4 40 70 80 2 2.5 2 2 n.a. 3.6 3.5 n.a.  . 
Spain 30.4 17 67 67 2.5 2 3 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 12 . 
Sweden 82.1 88 83 72 3 2 3 2 13 2.0 2.0 4.5 2 0.21 
Switzerland 32.9 24 53 50 2 2   3 n.a. 2.7 12.5  . 
UK 48.3 32 70 35 2 1 2 1 5 2.8 3.3 19 20 0.39 
USA 22.8 . 26 13 1 1 1 1 2 4.8 5.6 25 23 0.39 
correlation with Calmfors/Driffill centralization ranking 
1980s 0.69* 0.59 0.79* 0.77* 0.78* 0.68* 0.93* 0.80* 1.00 -0.68 -0.65 -0.73* -0.82* -0.84* 
1) low rankings = low degree of centralization 
* significant at 5% 
source:  OECD, Employment Outlook 1996, 
earning inequality specifics: US from Employment Outlook 1993, Canada 1981, New Zealand 1984, Portugal, Netherlands 1985, 
Belgium 1986, Germany 1984, Norway 1979, 1991. 
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But what actually causes the dispersion of wages? A narrow wage distribution may indicate 
institutional wage compression but may also be caused by a narrow skill distribution. Countries 
with a wide dispersion of skills are expected to have a wide dispersion of wages and if countries 
with decentralized wage bargaining systems also have wide distributions of skills, conclusions on 
the impact of institutions on wage dispersion drawn from the ‘raw’ wage differentials will suffer 
from a spurious correlation. Joop Hartog and Coen Teulings collected the results of micro-data 
wage regressions, which -following the seminal work of Krueger and Summers (1988)- regressed 
wages on personal characteristics such as years of schooling, age, experience, firm size, etc. (see 
Teulings/Hartog 1998). In efficient, competitive labor markets, the residuals should be small 
because wages should represent marginal productivity according to individual characteristics (for 
a comprehensive discussion see Krueger/Summers 1988). However, the unexplained wage 
variations (the residuals) in column 6 of Table 3.2 correlate negatively with the centralization of 
bargaining institutions, suggesting that decentralized bargaining systems create wide wage 
dispersion not related to ‘economic fundamentals’.2 In other words, it seems to be decentralized 
rather than corporatist wage bargaining systems that create large unexplained wage residuals. 
How can this be? Several factors may explain this unexpected result: (1) rent-seeking, (2) 
information problems, (3) unobserved ability.  
(1) In decentralized bargaining systems, the ‘hold-up’ problem may be more severe. In other 
words, workers or their company unions may use their insider positions to extract rents. The 
decentralized bargaining system is implicitly equated to the ‘perfect market’ but this is 
inadequate because labor markets are inherently imperfect and thus invariably inhibit some 
market power. Even less organized workers have market power at the individual firm level. 
Companies invested in hiring, training etc. (see the summary on efficiency wage models by 
Akerlof/Yellen 1986) may use their position to extract rents, as may workers. Although the 
bargaining position of workers is weak in firms suffering from decline in demand, their 
position in expanding firms is very strong and they can use this situation to raise their 
wages. Thus, decentralized bargaining systems may impose more wage restraint in 
declining firms but also allow more rent-seeking in expanding firms and thus create more 
variation. Rent-seeking behavior may be less severe in more centralized bargaining systems, 
where the specific company situation does not affect bargaining. More centralized 
bargaining systems are less responsive to local demand trends, but this coin has two sides: 
on the one hand, such systems do not allow firms hit by negative demand shocks to lower 
wages (see Akerlof/Dickens/Perry 1996 for a summary of the empirical evidence) but, on 
the other, wages do not rise as much in firms hit by positive demand shocks. However, the 
greatest expansion in employment will be achieved where wage restraint is practised in 
expanding firms or industries because the expansionary demand effect will not be reduced 
                                                 
2  Of course, it can always be argued that the divergent result is due to unobserved variables, but this is not 
always very convincing (see Krueger’s and Summers’ (1988) discussion of this issue). 
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by rising prices (for a discussion, see Bell/Freeman 1985). Which effect dominates will 
depend on the distribution of shocks.  
 It may be argued, however, that wage differentials between expanding and contracting firms 
or between expanding and declining occupations are necessary to guide workers into the 
jobs in which their labor can be most efficiently used.  
(2) Markets without an auctioneer suffer from information problems. Without an auctioneer, 
wages are the outcome of bilateral bargaining in decentralized bargaining systems. 
Individual pairs of workers and employers conclude contracts based on wages different 
from the market-clearing equilibrium wage (Chamberlain 1948). Thus, individual wages 
will initially depart from the equilibrium wage and it is only after a sequence of adjustments 
-which require either renegotiable contracts or labor mobility- that the market-clearing wage 
can be achieved. Searching for the equilibrium wage is costly because the convergence to 
the market wage has to occur through a process of trial and error. If renegotiations are 
difficult, firm-worker pairs with wages below the market level will result in quits, whereas 
those with wages above the equilibrium level will result in dismissals. Again the term 
‘market wage’ and ‘equilibrium wage’ are used, but with incomplete information even 
‘equilibrium wage’ contracts may result in quits or dismissals if the local information 
indicates over or under-payment (see Schelling 1978 for an analysis of macro-outcomes of 
processes with local information). In more centralized bargaining systems, unions and 
employers' associations may be seen as a substitute for the auctioneer because they may 
have knowledge about the relevant demand and supply functions and can thus determine the 
market-clearing wage. The consultancy company ‘HAY’ actually serves as an information 
pool for wage data: using a standardized job classification, it collects data on wages and 
makes this information available to their clients. If bargaining institutions substitute for the 
auctioneer, the unexplained residual in wage regressions should be a falling function of 
centralization. This is consistent with the data in Table 3.1. 
(3) Variables used in wage regressions may not be a sufficiently accurate measure of workers’ 
ability. In other words, the residual may be due to unobserved ability. ‘Years of formal 
education’ can be an especially misleading measure in international comparisons, because 
what is learnt in the course of a year can vary substantially between schools and certainly 
between countries (Freeman/Schettkat 2000). The OECD’s adult literacy survey provides 
data on skills based on standardized literacy scores for the adult population (see OECD 
1997). Scores vary from 0 to a maximum of 500. The median skill scores in the IALS 
survey do not differ very much between the US, Germany, Sweden, the UK and the 
Netherlands (285, 285, 310, 276, 292 respectively). The upper end of the skill distribution 
also seems to be roughly similar (see Table 3.3), while skill distributions at the lower end of 
the labor market are clearly different, especially between the US and the continental 
European countries.   
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Wage structure and employment 
Describing the skill range of the lower half of the labor market by the median skill score of the 
employed (D5employed) at the upper bound and the first decile skill score of the unemployed 
(D1unemployed) at the lower bound, it emerges (in line 5 of Table 3.2) that the median score for the 
employed is 2.5 times that of the first decile of the unemployed in the US, but only about 1.3 to 
1.5 times in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands (and 1.7 in the UK). This is a surprising 
result, given that the continental European wage bargaining systems are alleged to 'crowd out' the 
least skilled workers, who are thought to be excluded from employment because their wages are 
set above their productivity level. Under the 'wage compression hypothesis', one would expect 
the skill score of the lowest decile of the unemployed to be roughly equal to the skill score of the 
employed in the US, where the flexible wage system is claimed to allow low-skilled workers to 
price themselves into employment via wage concessions. In continental European countries, on 
the other hand, the 'wage compression hypothesis' would predict a huge gap between the skill 
scores of the lowest decile of the employed and the unemployed, because unemployment should 
be concentrated among the least skilled workers, who are allegedly pushed out of employment by 
excessive minimum wages. The empirical facts are exactly the reverse of what the wage 
compression hypothesis predicts.3 
Apparently the wage distribution is also wider because the US skill distribution is wider than 
those in the continental European countries. Furthermore, the integrative effect of flexible US 
wages cannot be found in the data. The skill differential between the employed and unemployed 
is high in the US but comparatively low in Europe. This is in total contrast with the ‘wage 
compression hypothesis’, which alleges that European-type welfare state institutions exclude 
low-skilled workers from employment (see Freeman/Schettkat 2000). The unexplained residual 
in wage regression, which can be taken as an efficiency measure for labor market institutions, is 
also higher in countries with decentralized bargaining systems. This result is consistent with the 
view that labor markets are fundamentally imperfect markets and that the transaction costs to 
achieve the market-clearing equilibrium wage are high in decentralized bargaining systems. From 
a theoretical perspective, centralized bargaining systems may collect information and substitute 
for the auctioneer. 
                                                 
3   For an analysis of why ‘pricing-in’ does not occur even in the US, see Bewley 1995.  
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Table 3.2: Skill and wage differentials   
 
 US Germany Sweden UK Netherlands 
1. wages       
D9/D5 2.10 (1995) 1.61 (1993) 1.59 (1993) 1.87 (1995) 1.66 (1994) 
D5/D1 2.09 (1995) 1.44 (1993) 1.34 (1993) 1.81 (1995) 1.56 (1994) 
Skills (literacy scores)  
2.  total population aged 15-64 years 
D9/D5 1.22 1.19 1.17 1.23 1.15 
D5/D1 1.57 1.24 1.28 1.47 1.28 
3.  employed 
D9/D5 1.21 1.18 1.16 1.19 1.13 
D5/D1 1.41 1.22 1.22 1.36 1.24 
4.  unemployed  
D9/D5 1.28 1.21 1.16 1.27 1.21 
D5/D1 2.17 1.32 1.30 1.52 1.44 
5.  D5 employed / D1 unemployed 
 2.48 1.39 1.34 1.72 1.49 
wage deciles ratio / skill deciles ratio 
6.  employed      
D9/D5 1.74 1.36 1.37 1.57 1.47 
D5/D1 1.48 1.18 1.10 1.33 1.26 
7.  (D5/D1)wages / (D5employed / D1unemployed) skills 
 .85 1.04 1.00 1.05 1.05 
Source:  computations are based on OECD Employment Outlook 1999: 62 for wage deciles and IALS 
for skill deciles. 
 
The values in row 7 are computed as:   
5
1
5
1
D
D
D
D
Wage
Wage
Skill
Skill
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3.2 Employment protection 
Employment protection is high on the ‘black list’ of welfare state institutions. In a probably 
oversimplified description of the costs of employment protection, which nevertheless captures the 
major issues of the discussion, employment protection is interpreted as imposing additional costs 
and thus shifting the labor demand function downwards.4 An economy which is in equilibrium at 
E’ and is now facing the costs of employment protection will shift c.p. to the new equilibrium 
E’’. Employment will be lower than it would have been without employment protection. Peering 
across the Atlantic, this relation is used to argue that employment protection costs a total of E’-
E’’ jobs (for a discussion along these lines, see e.g. Flanagan 1989, Schellhaas 1989).  
 
Figure 3.1: The Effect of Employment Protection on Jobs 
 
 
 
                                                 
4   This presentation is similar to the Summers (1989) analysis of mandatory benefits. 
wages, wage costs
employment
Ld’
Ld’’
E’E’’
Ls’
Ls’’
Ld’ = labor demand function without employment protection, Ld’’ with employment protection
Ls’ = labor supply function without employment protection, Ls’’ with employment protection
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How far the labor demand function shifts downwards when employment protection is introduced 
depends on the interest of firms themselves in stable employment relations. Many theoretical 
arguments suggest that firms have an original interest in stable employment relations because of 
search and hiring costs, training costs, learning, subtle rules of firm-specific organization, 
familiarity with firm-specific customs etc.. The more the firm regards its employees as assets, the 
lower will be the cost of employment protection. As a minimum wage below the lowest wage 
will have no effect on labor demand, employment protection legislation representing the status 
quo of employment relations will not affect firms’ costs and therefore leave labor demand 
unchanged. If employment protection legislation simply codifies common practice, the average 
firm may not suffer additional costs. Although this may be an extreme case, it is generally true 
that employment protection creates additional costs for firms only to the extent that it raises 
employment stability above the optimum level that they would choose anyway. 
The costs of employment protection also depend on the skill structure in the particular firm, 
the outside options, and thus the general labor market situation (for a more comprehensive 
discussion, see Schettkat 1997). 
Since markets have two sides, any additional costs for the firm created by employment 
protection may be compensated by a downward shift in the labor supply function. If workers pay 
an actuarially fair insurance premium for job security, deregulation of employment protection 
will have no employment effect at all. This is the essence of implicit-contract models. In Figure 
3.1 the new equilibrium may occur at a lower wage than without employment protection and 
employment may even remain at the former level.5 Thus the relationship between dismissal 
protection and employment is theoretically not as clear-cut as is often suggested (Bertola and 
Bentolila 1990, Bertola 1992).  
Table 3.3 lists variables describing potentially relevant aspects of employment protection. 
‘Employment protection’ is a summary indicator of the strictness of employment protection 
legislation, distinguishing between regular and temporary employment. The higher the value of 
the indicator, the stricter the employment protection. There is obviously substantial variation in 
this indicator, both OECD-wide and within Europe. The strictest regulations for regular 
employment (column 1) are found in Portugal and the Netherlands, two countries regarded as 
successful in reducing unemployment. However, only Portugal has relaxed employment 
protection sufficiently to affect the indicator displayed (Table 3.3, column 2).6 As column 2 
                                                 
5   It can be argued that legal employment protection as opposed to voluntarily negotiated employment security 
shifts power to the employees and may be misused to push up wages. However, this effect may be more 
important in decentralized bargaining systems and actually eliminated in more centralized ones. 
6  Olivier Blanchard and Pedro Portugal (2001) argue that employment protection slows down adjustment to 
shocks because there is a negative correlation between dismissals and employment protection but a positive 
correlation between unemployment duration and employment protection. These two effects cancel out when 
the relationship between unemployment rates and employment protection is analyzed. 
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indicates, deregulation has not been the rule in Europe for regular employment, but has been for 
temporary employment, which has been eased in 7 European countries (column 4). However, 
there is no significant correlation between deregulation (negative signs in columns 2 and 4) and 
the initial regulation levels (columns 1 and 3). By contrast, regulation levels for regular and 
temporary employment correlate positively (r = .64, significant at 1%). It does not generally seem 
to be the case that countries with tight regulation of regular permanent employment compensate 
for this by less stringent regulation of temporary contracts, although this does appear to occur in 
Spain. Of course, employers try to shift to temporary employment if labor market conditions 
make it feasible, but in ‘normal’ labor markets they fear quits from those working under 
unfavorable contracts (Schettkat 1997). 
                                                                                                                                                              
 However, Abraham/Houseman (1993) found that employment (measured in hours) adjusts as quickly in 
Germany as in the US and that, even in terms of staff numbers, adjustment is similar in both economies after 
one year.  
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Table 3.3: Employment Protection, and Product Market Regulation 
 
Strictness of employment protection 
regular employment temporary employment 
 difference  difference 
Product 
market 
regulation 
late 1990s 1990-1980 late 1990s 1990-1980  
Country 
1 2 3 4 5 
      
Australia 1.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 1.2 
Austria 2.6 0.0 1.8 0.0 1.9 
Belgium 1.5 0.0 4.6 0.0 2.8 
Canada 0.9 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Denmark 1.6 0.0 0.9 -1.7 1.9 
Finland 2.1 -0.6 1.9 0.0 2.2 
France 2.3 0.0 3.6 0.5 2.8 
Germany 2.8 0.1 2.3 -1.5 1.9 
Ireland 1.6 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.1 
Italy 2.8 0.0 3.8 -1.6 3.2 
Japan 2.7 0.0 2.1 . 1.9 
Netherlands 3.1 0.0 1.2 -1.2 1.9 
New Zealand 1.7 . 0.4 . 1.4 
Norway 2.4 0.0 2.8 -0.7 2.1 
Portugal 4.3 -0.5 3.0 -0.4 2.0 
Spain 2.6 -1.3 3.5 0.0 2.1 
Sweden 2.8 0.0 1.6 -2.5 1.6 
Switzerland 1.2 0.0 0.9 0.0 2.1 
UK 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.5 
USA 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 
correlation with 
protection in regular 
employment 
 
1.00 
 
-0.23 
 
.56* 
 
-0.37 
 
0.52* 
 
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook June 1999 
* = significant at the 1% level  
If employment protection has a negative effect on jobs, there should be a negative correlation 
between the protection measures in Table 3.3 and employment. However, no significant 
correlation could be found (at the 5% significance level) either for employment-population rates 
or for changes in them. There is therefore no support for the ‘reluctance to hire’ hypothesis in 
general. However, there is a significant negative correlation (at the 5% significance level) 
between the share of personnel in the 'trade, hotels, restaurants' sector in the general population 
(employment-population rates for this specific service industry) and the regulation of temporary 
employment (r = -.56 in the 1980 and r = -.51 in the 1990s) and the regulation of regular 
employment in the 1980s (r = -.56, 5% significance level) but not in the 1990s (r = - .40, 
insignificant at the 10% level only). Thus there is some evidence that employment protection 
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may affect employment in private-sector industries providing consumer services, which are most 
likely to be affected by Baumol's cost disease. More flexible employment arrangements may help 
to reduce costs here and the average skill level in the 'trade, hotels, restaurants' sector is below the 
average (based on the IALS data base, Schettkat 2001c). In other words, the correlation seems to 
be concentrated in unstable, low-paid jobs.  
In an analysis of direct foreign investment into the UK and Germany, two countries with 
distinct labor market regulations and employment protection, Kerstin Pull (2002) finds that the 
‘deregulated’ UK environment attracts more short-term oriented investment with a low share of 
R&D and skilled labor. Foreign direct investment into Germany, on the contrary, is more long-
term oriented with a higher share of R&D and high-skilled workers.    
This is exactly the area where easing fixed-term contracts was found to be relevant in a 
detailed analysis of a 'natural experiment' (the introduction of the Employment Promotion Act 
1985 in Germany). The law was highly controversial (for details see Fuchs/Schettkat 2000) and 
was later evaluated by a major study (Büchtemann/Höland 1989). This study found that fixed-
term contracts were used mainly in small and medium-sized companies, which typically account 
for a large share of low-skilled labor, and that a major motive for using them was selection (cited 
by 40% of the firms concerned). Employers used the fixed term as an extended probationary 
period in order to overcome information asymmetries. Once employers have confidence in the 
skills of workers, they are obviously interested in long-term relationships, because hiring is costly 
(even at the low-skill end of the jobs market).7 Thus, even if employment protection measures do 
not have a strong effect on overall employment, they may affect employment in 'technologically 
stagnant' industries where the mean skill level is low. 
Given the theoretical ambiguity of employment protection, it is not surprising that detailed 
empirical studies find that the relaxation of employment protection has little if any impact. The 
literature suggests that variations in employment protection over time do not affect the 
employment adjustments made by firms (Fuchs/Schettkat 2000).  
                                                 
7  Using different data, Abraham and Houseman (1993) and Kraft (1994) found no evidence that the Employment 
Promotion Act had changed the speed of employment adjustments, as would have been expected from 'non-
hiring' models. Evaluation of the prolonged Employment Promotion Acts (Bielenski, H./Kohler, B./Schreiber-
Kittl, M. 1994) comes to conclusions similar to those of Büchtemann and Höland. No increased use of fixed-
term contracts was observed between 1985 and 1994: the share remained at 5-6% of all new contracts. Most 
surprisingly of all, the share of fixed-term contracts did not vary over the business cycle (Bielenski 1997, also 
Kraft 1994). 
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3.3 Incentives: Minimum Wages, Transfers and Wedges 
Probably the most prominent allegation against welfare states is that they create disincentives to 
work. Pecuniary incentives to work depend on the difference between net transfers and the net 
wage. In other words, wages, taxes, contributions and benefits all influence the so-called wedge. 
However, the combined impact of taxes and benefits on incentives to work in different countries 
are difficult to compare because these variables are rarely uniform and often depend on family 
status, the presence of children, income, etc. Furthermore, unemployment benefits are exempt 
from taxation and contributions in some countries but not in others. In order to achieve a better 
comparison of the impact of regulation on incentives to work in different countries, the Dutch 
Central Planning Bureau (CPB, 1995) investigated transfers and contributions for different types 
of households and income classes.. Its study included a comprehensive set of related benefits, 
like family allowances and rent subsidies, in addition to obvious transfers like unemployment 
benefits. There is also an OECD study producing data on the redistribution of income. 
Replacement rates 
The purpose of unemployment insurance is to reduce the economic pressure on workers who 
have lost their jobs. Since higher replacement rates and longer eligibility periods will tend to 
reduce search intensities, countries with more generous unemployment insurance systems (or 
transfer systems in general) should show higher rates of equilibrium unemployment. Steve 
Nickell (1998) found that unemployment patterns across countries are consistent with this thesis, 
but mentions that the longitudinal evidence within countries does not support it. Detailed 
econometric studies based on micro-data find that replacement rates have either no effect or very 
mixed effects on unemployment.8 Eligibility periods seem to have a major effect on 
unemployment duration in econometric studies (see for a summary and literature Fuchs/Schettkat 
2000), but the causation is unclear. Is it longer eligibility that causes longer duration, or have 
longer eligibility periods been introduced because of the increasing difficulty of finding jobs (for 
example, longer eligibility periods have been introduced in many countries for the elderly). 
Longer search may improve the quality of matches and may thus be beneficial to both individual 
workers and society (Acemoglu/Shimer 2000). This idea is confirmed by a study by Kostas 
Mavromaras (1992) for the IAB (Institute for Labour Market Research Nuremberg, Germany), 
which shows that longer duration of search leads to higher employment stability in subsequent 
jobs, although very long search duration reduces the probability of finding a fixed-term or 
permanent position. In addition, it short unemployment duration in the US is related to a high 
probability of leaving the labor force rather than by a high probability to leave for employment 
(Schettkat 1992, Gangl 2002). Markus Gangl (2002, 185) also shows in his US-German 
comparison that benefit recipients search somewhat longer before accepting employment in both 
                                                 
8   In a historical analysis of the ‘benefit misuse’ argument Gűnther Schmid (Schmid et al.) shows that this follows 
a ‘political business cycle’. 
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countries but they also interrupt search less often and are more likely to exit unemployment into 
employment. 
However, long unemployment duration may signal negative selection and this actually 
creates an incentive for workers to search intensely. Employers may take unemployment duration 
as a productivity signal and believe that long durations may signal a ‘lemon’ (an unemployed 
individual who is not genuinely interested in working or who has been rejected by other 
employers). Long periods of unemployment will therefore affect the worker's expected future 
income and this may make it irrational to allow unemployment to continue for too long 
(Schettkat 1996, Russo/Gorter/Schettkat 2001). Indeed, most unemployment spells are very short. 
Table 3.4 shows the net replacement rates for different types of households and durations of 
unemployment. For minimum wage earners, Portugal and Spain actually create disincentives to 
work and in many countries the replacement rates do not change over time, although they drop 
substantially in some other countries. Again, there is only one household type for which the 
German system provides higher replacement rates than the Dutch for all periods of 
unemployment (the single-earner couple with two children on a minimum wage). We conclude 
therefore that the unemployment insurance system cannot provide a plausible explanation for the 
higher rate of unemployment in Germany compared to the Netherlands. 
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Table 3.4: Net replacement rates (in %) for different household types by unemployment duration 
minimum wage APW 
after … months initial after … months 
12 24 60 in % of 12 24 60 
country/state 
initial 
in % of 
income % of initital replacement 
 
income % of initial replacement 
Single 
Belgium 77 83.9 83.9 83.9  67.1 69.9 69.9 69.9 
Denmark 95.4 100.0 100.0 100.0  79.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Germany 78.6 100.0 100.0 100.0  61.1 89.7 89.7 89.7 
Spain 106.5 100.0 100.0 43.9  83.7 85.7 85.7 27.7 
France 89.3 100.0 89.9 70.0  80.4 100.0 90.8 58.1 
Ireland 72.5 100.0 100.0 100.0  43.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Italy 79.4 87.3 53.5 53.5  55.5 100.0 49.9 49.9 
Netherlands 84.8 100.0 100.0 100.0  74.2 100.0 76.5 76.5 
Portugal 112.4 100.0 70.0 0.0  78.7 100..0 52.9 0.0 
UK 79.7 100.0 99.1 99.1  41.4 100.0 99.3 99.3 
European average* 87.6 97.1 89.6 75.0  66.6 94.5 81.5 67.1 
New York 50.4 136.5 136.5 136.5  53.4 56.9 56.9 56.9 
Texas 50.2 33.7 33.7 33.7  51.8 12.9 12.9 12.9 
California 47.8 100.0 127.4 127.4  40.5 62.7 62.7 62.7 
US 3 state average 49.5 90.1 99.2 99.2  48.6 44.2 44.2 44.2 
one earner couple, 2 children 
Belgium 80.8 105.6 105.6 1ß5.6  62.5 105.0 105.0 105.0 
Denmark 96.8 100.0 100.0 100.0  86.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Germany 111.8 100.0 100.0 100.0  74.0 92.7 92.7 92.7 
Spain 105.9 100.0 100.0 76.8  77.3 91.2 91.2 52.8 
France 90.0 100.0 98.8 98.0  79.5 100.0 90.3 82.0 
Ireland 115.4 100.0 100.0 100.0  74.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Italy 86.8 100.0 100.0 100.0  65.6 100.0 96.3 96.3 
Netherlands 99.5 100.0 100.0 100.0  81.5 100.0 94.0 94.0 
Portugal 111.1 100.0 100.0 8.8  75.9 100.0 77.2 6.9 
UK 86.1 100.0 100.0 100.0  69.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 
European average* 98.4 100.6 100.4 88.9  74.7 98.9 94.7 83.0 
New York 104.2 88.0 88.0 88.0  48.6 117.9 117.9 117.9 
Texas 36.7 129.4 129.4 129.4  46.5 58.7 58.7 58.7 
California 72.0 100.0 127.8 127.8  36.6 100.0 146.2 146.2 
US 3 state average 71.0 105.8 115.1 115.1  43.9 92.2 107.6 107.6 
source: computations  are based on CPB 1995 
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3.4 Wedges and Incentives to Work 
A minimum wage level can exist even where there is no statutory minimum wage. The social 
security system sets a reservation wage below which hardly anybody will be willing to work 
in practice (see e.g. Sinn 1998, Scharpf 1993, McKinsey Global Institute 1997). ‘Rather than 
guaranteeing a high standard of living, high minimum wages actually keep low-skilled 
workers out of work’ (McKinsey Global Institute 1997). In this way, the social security 
system drives out low-skilled jobs, while not creating public-sector jobs (Zukunftskommision 
der Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 1998). What then is the level of minimum wages in practice? 
Recent analysis shows that the reservation wage in Germany, as defined by the social security 
system, is not as high as is commonly believed. It stands at about 32% of the mean wage. This 
is less than the minimum wage as a proportion of the mean wage in the US (about 35%, see 
Freeman/Schettkat 1998). Table 3.5 provides an overview of gross wages and net disposable 
income of minimum wage-earners as a percentage of the mean wages in various countries and 
three American states. Again the picture is diverse and seems not to be related to 
unemployment patterns. 
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Table 3.5: Minimum wages as % of the mean wage 
 
disposable wage 
country (state) gross wage single 
one-earner couple 
with 2 children 
    
Belgium 0,53 0,65 0,69 
Denmark 0,59 0,72 0,78 
France 0,63 0,74 0,72 
Germany 0,38 0,48 0,57 
Ireland 0,49 0,57 0,63 
Italy 0,61 0,65 0,73 
Netherlands 0,57 0,64 0,75 
Portugal 0,49 0,53 0,53 
Spain 0,44 0,50 0,50 
United Kingdom 0,39 0,47 0,77 
    
European average* 0,50 0,58 0,65 
    
USA (3 states)* 0,35 0,41 0,59 
    
New York 0,35 0,42 0,62 
Texas 0,35 0,39 0,57 
California 0,35 0,41 0,57 
* unweighted 
lowest collectively bargained wage in countries (Denmark, Germany, Italy) 
without a statutory minimum wage 
Source: computations based on CPB 1995 
The left-hand columns of Table 3.6 display disposable earned income as a percentage of 
transfers. Again, it is important to distinguish between household types, since transfers and 
taxes often have family components. Clearly, poverty traps (ratios of less than 100%) can 
occur for single-earner couples with children, because transfers are often based on the income 
necessary to achieve an acceptable standard of living. However, the table suggests that the 
actual poverty-trap phenomenon is largely confined to families with low earning potential. 
For the average production worker, the income from work is higher than that from benefits. 
Surprisingly from the European perspective, New York state shows values similar to those in 
European countries (Table 3.6), although other American states are clearly less generous.   
For a single person on the lowest collectively agreed wage, earned income as a 
percentage of transfers is similar in Germany and the Netherlands. For the average production 
worker, however, Germany provides a much higher 'incentive' to work than the Netherlands, 
although the earned net income is still 84% higher than the transfer level in the Netherlands. 
For a single-earner couple with two children, the CPB has identified a clear disincentive to 
work in Germany. In that case, the earned income would be about 15% lower than the 
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transfers in Germany, whereas in the Netherlands there is a 5% gain in net income for a 
single-earner couple on the lowest collectively agreed wage. For the average production 
worker, the incentive to work would again be higher in Germany. 
The right-hand columns of Table 3.6 display marginal tax rates for a minimum wage 
earner, an average production worker and an employee earning twice the average production 
worker's wage. Because earned income reduces benefits, marginal tax rates can be very high 
for those on low wages and may actually decline as income increases. Only Spain, Portugal 
and Ireland show marginal tax rates for minimum wages substantially below the rates for 
better paid workers. In all cases, however, the Dutch marginal tax rates (including 
contributions) are higher than those in Germany.  
 
Table 3.6: Disposable income as a percentage of benefits, marginal tax wedges 
disposable income as a percentage of 
transfers 
Marginal wedge 
single single-earner family, 
2 children 
 
Country (state) 
Minimum 
wage 
APW Minimum 
wage 
APW min wage APW 2*APW 
        
Belgium 163 252 126 181 56.7 63.4 69.9 
Denmark 122 170 126 163 62.3 60.3 69.7 
Germany 127 266 89 158 49.9 52.6 35.6 
Spain 214 430 123 245 28.6 44.2 48.6 
France 177 241 115 159 50.9 54.5 55.6 
Ireland 138 240 87 138 26.5 49 51.7 
Italy 235 361 115 158 53.9 54.5 54.6 
Netherlands 117 184 100 134 58.6 53.9 59.7 
Portugal 127 240 99 188 29.1 41.5 50.5 
United Kingdom 127 270 116 151 74.3 40.2 43.9 
        
European average* 155 265 110 168 49.1 51.4 53.9 
        
US 3 state average 300 751 143 244 39.1 34.1 45.9 
        
New York 145 345 109 177 41.6 39.1 51 
Texas 591 1503 210 366 37.4 29.7 39.9 
California 164 405 109 188 38.3 33.4 46.8 
* unweighted 
lowest collectively bargained wage in countries (Denmark, Germany, Italy) without a statutory minimum wage 
Source: computations based on CPB 1995 
The difference between the inequality of market incomes and inequality in final incomes 
seems to be an adequate measure for the extent of redistribution. Table 3.7 shows the Gini 
coefficients for the 1980s and the 1990s for market income and final income, as published in 
an OECD occasional paper (No. 51, 2001, authors: Arjona/Ladaique/Pearson). This shows 
that the Anglo-Saxon countries are near the top of the list with respect both to the inequality 
of market incomes and to overall income (after taxation and transfers). The data also show 
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that the Scandinavian and continental European countries have a strong emphasis on 
redistribution, as measured by the difference in the Gini coefficients (Gini overall – Gini 
market). The US showed the highest Gini coefficients in the 1980s but not in the 1990s. The 
standard Gini coefficients for market income rose by 25% over that period. Most remarkable 
is the dramatic change in the Gini for market income in Sweden, which was much lower for 
final income (the reverse of the usual trend). Here the cross-country standard deviation 
dropped by 20% between the 1980s and the 1990s. However, as market inequality increased, 
redistribution (as measured by the Ginis) rose. Again, Germany and the Netherlands have 
roughly similar Ginis for market income, with greater redistribution in the Netherlands. 
According to the conventional wisdom, the result should be a less favorable employment 
situation in the Netherlands.  
 
Table 3.7: Distribution and redistribution of income; Gini coefficients for overall and market 
income, working age population 
Country  1980s   1990s  change 1990s - 1980s 
 Gini Gini Difference Gini Gini Difference Gini Gini 
 overall market (1) - (2) overall market (4) - (5) overall market 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
         
Australia 0.30 0.39 -0.09 0.29 0.41 -0.12 -0.01 0.02 
Austria 0.23 . . 0.23 . . 0.00 . 
Belgium . . . 0.27 0.47 -0.20 . . 
Canada 0.29 0.37 -0.08 0.29 0.39 -0.10 0.00 0.02 
Denmark 0.21 0.32 -0.11 0.21 0.36 -0.15 0.00 0.04 
Finland 0.21 0.31 -0.10 0.24 0.38 -0.14 0.03 0.07 
France 0.27 0.39 -0.12 0.28 0.41 -0.13 0.01 0.02 
Germany 0.26 0.36 -0.10 0.28 0.37 -0.09 0.02 0.01 
Ireland 0.34 0.47 -0.13 0.32 . . 0.02 . 
Italy 0.31 0.39 -0.08 0.34 0.46 -0.12 -0.03 0.07 
Japan . . .  . . . . 
Netherlands 0.24 0.38 -0.14 0.25 0.38 -0.13 0.01 0.00 
New Zealand . . .   0.00 . . 
Norway 0.22 0.29 -0.07 0.25 0.34 -0.09 0.03 0.05 
Portugal . . . . . . . . 
Spain . . . . . . . . 
Sweden 0.21 0.32 -0.11 0.25 0.42 -0.17 0.04 0.10 
Switzerland . . . 0.26 0.29 -0.03 . . 
UK 0.28 0.39 -0.11 0.30 0.42 -0.12 0.02 0.03 
USA 0.33 0.40 -0.07 0.33 0.41 -0.08 0.00 0.01 
Source: computations are based on OECD 2001(Arjona/Ladaique/Pearson, Occasional Paper No. 51) 
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4. Conclusions 
Many welfare state institutions are blamed to cause labor market inefficiencies and 
consequently high unemployment in Europe. Closer inspection reveals, however, that the 
impact of welfare state institutions on economic performance and employment is not as clear-
cut as some analysts suggest. At both the theoretical and the empirical level, the picture is 
ambiguous and this study must conclude that the empirical evidence in support of the idea 
that European unemployment is caused by European welfare state mechanisms is extremely 
weak.9 Ranking countries in terms of the ‘usual suspects’ (i.e. redistribution, the level of 
minimum wages, employment protection, disposable minimum-wage income relative to net 
transfers, and net unemployment replacement rates) and correlate them with the ranks of the 
unemployment rates produces a very diverse picture as summarized in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 4.1: Correlations coefficients for country rankings, unemployment rates  
and for major institutional variables 
 
Unem-
ployment 
rate 
Inequality 
market 
incomes 
Redistri-
bution 
Employment 
protection 
Wage 
differentials 
(D9 / D1) 
Minimum 
wage/ 
average 
wage* 
Disposable 
minimum 
wage-
income / 
net 
transfers** 
Net 
replacement 
rate*** 
1980 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 
1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Source: computations based on countries ranks from Tables for the countries in Table 3.5,  
*      for a single, countries as in Table  3.6 
**    for a single, countries as in Table 3.6 
***  for a single, countries as in table 3.4 
There are only two significant (at the 10% level) rank correlations in the table. One is between 
inequality of market incomes and the unemployment rate in 1999. Hear, however, the 
coefficient has a positive sign, meaning that higher unemployment goes together with higher 
inequality.  Similarly, wage differentials (D9 / D1). Again, if anything, higher wage 
differentials correlate positively with unemployment rates in 1980. In all other cases are the 
correlations coefficients insignificant at the 10% level. This also applies to net unemployment 
                                                 
9   This result is in line with previous studies (e.g. Blank/Freeman 1994, Atkinson 2000, Buttler/Franz/ 
Schettkat/Soskice 1996, Gregg/ Manning 1997, Esping-Andersen/Regini 2000, Aggell 1999, Freeman/ 
Schettkat 2000). 
28 
replacement rates. In short, the rank correlations between institutional variables, which may 
be taken to represent the ‘usual suspects’ do not show the expected impact on unemployment 
rates. For itself, of course, these correlations would be at best a hint that the deregulationists’ 
claim of the negative labor market effects of welfare state institutions may not hold. However, 
given the theoretical ambiguity and the indetermined empirical evidence, the correlations 
Table 5.1 may be rather taken as a summary of the argument: The relation between welfare 
state institutions and labor market performance is highly complex and deductions of the 
impacts from the perfect market model may be very misleading. 
However, there may be many reasons why the alleged negative effects of welfare state 
institutions are not confirmed in the analysis. First of all, the indicators used for institutional 
arrangements are at best approximations and it may well be that the concerted action of 
institutions creates effects undiscovered in the analysis of individual institutions (system 
effects). In general the information on institutions is weak and for inter-temporal analysis 
hardly available. Furthermore, little is known about the complex interaction of institutions and 
economic variables, which may in fact depend on the macroeconomic situation (see 
Blanchard/Wolfers 2000). In many analyses this problem is circumvented by referring to the 
perfect market model. Compared to the perfect market situation, any deviation from ‘perfect 
market’ institutions is deemed to be a rigidity and the typical analysis following this approach 
creates a long list of these. The message then is to shape the world according to the perfect 
market model, usually ignoring ‘natural imperfections’. The deregulationists’ view gains its 
strength from the theoretical comparison of real world institutions with the perfect market 
model, supported by sketchy empirical examples. If the perfect model were correct, 
globalized capitalism would indeed select the most efficient institutions and there would 
indeed be nothing to choose for countries. The national institutions would converge to the one 
optimal arrangement. However, real markets suffer from natural imperfections and many 
institutions may have been introduced to compensate for these imperfections, which also give 
freedom for different national institutional arrangements. 
The conclusion should be that knowledge of the impacts of institutional arrangements on 
economic variables needs to be improved, even in detailed bi-country studies (e.g. 
Freeman/Schettkat 2002). There is a need for a better understanding of ‘how markets really 
work’ (Gordon 1990) as it is the program of many microeconomic studies. However, 
institutions will always have many ‘side-effects’ –both positive and negative- which will be 
hard to identify and even harder to quantify. There are many side-effects or second-round 
effects of welfare state institutions which, although often neglected, prove to be very 
important in the real ‘imperfect market’ world. And many welfare state institutions only have 
a clear-cut negative effect against the background of the theoretical perfect market model.  
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